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any and all things Tory. His sermon “The Nature of the Kingdom, or Church, of Christ,” preached before 
King George I in 1717, touched upon the political and theological controversies that followed in the wake 
of the Glorious Revolution. It also forwarded a radical ecclesiological schema: effectively arguing that the 
Church of England lacked real moral authority, he advocated for its subsumption under the state’s own 
auspices. An analysis of Hoadly’s sermon, as well as his conduct throughout the ensuing Bangorian 
controversy, will demonstrate that the Enlightenment extremism ascribed to him by some of his 
contemporaries was a not altogether unfair characterization of his thought. 
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Lough 1 
The decades following the Glorious Revolution saw the Church of England roiled by 
theological controversy. Parliament’s invitation of a non-Anglican monarch to the throne, the 
continued presence of nonconforming Protestants throughout the nation, and new strains of 
liberal thought all threw the Church’s relationship with the state into question. In 1717 Bishop 
Benjamin Hoadly of Bangor entered the fray with a sermon that itself became the subject of 
intense debate. “The Nature of the Kingdom, or Church, of Christ” was more than a distillation 
of the bishop’s Whig politics; its attack on the principle of religious coercion undermined the 
Church’s very existence as a visible institution, and reduced religious authority to the conviction 
of private judgment. Radically modern in its ecclesiology, Hoadly’s sermon illustrates the 
challenge posed by the English Enlightenment to preliberal ideas in both religion and politics. 
Hoadly’s reception in the academy has not been warm. Many scholars have either taken 
the side of his adversaries, pinning much of the blame for the eighteenth-century state’s triumph 
over the Church on his influence, or have treated him only tangentially in relation to the broader 
issues of his day. Into these camps fall Edwin R. Bingham in the 1940s, political theorist Richard 
Ashcraft, and early modern historian John Gascoigne, among others.  An effort undertaken over 1
the past two decades to rescue Hoadly from his associations with liberalism and from more 
1 William Bradford Gardner, “George Hickes and the Origin of the Bangorian Controversy,” 
Studies in Philology​ 35, no. 1 (1942): 65-78; Edwin R. Bingham, “The Political Apprenticeship 
of Benjamin Hoadly,” ​Church History ​16, no. 3 (1947): 154-65; Pedro Thomas Meza, “The 
Question of Authority in the Church of England, 1689 to 1717,” ​Historical Magazine of the 
Protestant Episcopal Church ​42, no. 1 (1973): 63-86; Richard Ashcraft and M.M. Goldsmith, 
“Locke, Revolution Principles, and the Formation of Whig Ideology,” ​The Historical Journal ​26, 
no. 4 (1983): 773-800; John Gascoigne, “The Unity of Church and State Challenged: Responses 
to Hooker from the Restoration to the Nineteenth-Century Age of Reform,” ​The Journal of 
Religious History​ 21, no. 1 (1997): 60-79; William C. Watson, “Rethinking the Late Stuart 
Church: The Extent of Liberal Anglicanism, 1688-1715,” ​Anglican and Episcopal History ​70, 
no. 2 (2001): 143-68. 
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outrageous accusations of deism has sought to call these judgments into question. Susan L. 
Rutherford, Guglielmo Sanna, and especially William Gibson, Hoadly’s first modern biographer, 
have laid most of the groundwork in this project.  While a more critical account of Hoadly’s 2
thought was undoubtedly necessary, the present study proposes a revision of the revision. There 
are many valuable insights to be gleaned from more recent contributions, but an analysis of “The 
Nature of the Kingdom” will demonstrate that the conclusions of earlier scholars were, in the 
main, correct. Insofar as it concerns his sermon’s composition and the ensuing Bangorian 
controversy, it is not without reason that Hoadly has been cast as a radical. After briefly treating 
the issues that motivated Anglican thinkers between 1688 and 1716, we will see that Hoadly 
helps us not only to understand the early modern Church of England, but the broader separation 
of spiritual and temporal authority that accompanied the rise of modern political philosophy. 
 
I. ​Setting the Scene: Nonjurors and Occasional Conformists 
The questions that framed Hoadly’s approach intimately linked religion with national politics, 
and the controversies that most informed “The Nature of the Kingdom” were rooted in the 
Glorious Revolution. Although it would secure Protestant hegemony on the throne, Parliament’s 
invitation to William of Orange in 1688 precipitated a decades-long rift within the Church of 
England. In what came to be known as the nonjuring schism, seven Anglican bishops and nearly 
2 Susan L. Rutherford, “Reformation Principles: The Religious and Political Ideas of Benjamin 
Hoadly (1676-1761)” (Ph.D. diss., University of Northumbria at Newcastle, 2000); Rutherford, 
“Benjamin Hoadly: Sacramental Tests and Eucharistic Thought in Early-Eighteenth Century 
England,” ​Anglican and Episcopal History ​71, no. 4 (2002): 473-97; William Gibson, 
Enlightenment Prelate: Benjamin Hoadly, 1676-1761​ (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2004); 
Guglielmo Sanna, “Latitudinarian Politics and the Shadow of Locke,” ​Anglican and Episcopal 
History ​85, no. 2 (2016): 141-63. 
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four hundred priests refused to recognize the legitimacy of William III after his accession in 
1689. These clerics were subsequently dismissed from their sees and parishes and replaced with 
churchmen loyal to the new regime.  The nonjurors protested not because they endorsed James 3
II’s Roman Catholicism, but because they had already sworn allegiance to a rightfully crowned 
king. Though they were relatively small in number, the state’s deprivation of their positions 
raised a number of concerns: How could Parliament depose the head of the Church of England, 
or interfere in a divinely-ordained hierarchy on the basis of political calculation? 
George Hickes, a prominent nonjuring bishop, addressed these problems in his 
Constitution of the Catholick Church​, published posthumously in 1716. The ​Constitution 
encapsulated the nonjurors’ thick conception of the English Church and its relationship with the 
state: because James II was the lawful king and head of the Church at the time he was deposed, 
however odious may have been his popery, Hickes saw it as nothing short of blasphemy to name 
his successors in the prayers of the liturgy.  In William Gibson’s summation, Hickes held that 4
“the Church was immune from the incursions of the State because it was Christ’s body on earth, 
and its ministers were Christ’s viceregents, who exercised independent authority over all men.”  5
If Anglican priests were the viceregents of Christ with authority in the earthly as well as the 
spiritual realm, then the Church could rightly stand above parliamentary dictate. By this logic it 
was the government, rather than the nonjurors, that had put itself in a state of schism when it 
deposed the sovereign and his faithful bishops. 
3 Meza, “The Question of Authority in the Church of England, 1689 to 1717,” 65. 
4 Gardner, “George Hickes and the Origin of the Bangorian Controversy,” 70-71. 
5 Gibson, ​Enlightenment Prelate​, 139. 
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The ​Constitution ​also expressed the nonjurors’ belief in the divine right of kings. For 
Hickes, “Principles are Principles, that is, they are very Strict and Rigid Things. They are like 
glass drops, you may easily break them, but you cannot bend them.”  Such strict and rigid 6
principles included James I’s famous doctrine that the sovereign’s authority comes from God and 
is answerable to God alone, and must therefore be obeyed in all things pertaining to his rule. 
Adherence to divine right, of course, was not limited to a fringe of High Church schismatics; as 
the party that championed the prerogatives of the monarchy and the rights of the Church, the 
Tories also endorsed divine right and the concomitant doctrine of passive obedience. However, 
their acceptance of the Glorious Revolution demonstrates that their concerns were more political 
than theological. The nonjurors, on the other hand, would broker no compromise. They added to 
the Tories’ rallying cries of “the Church in danger,” a call throughout the early-eighteenth 
century to defend the Church of England from various political and doctrinal encroachments, but 
did so from the perspective of a remnant amidst an apostate people.  7
The nonjurors justified their protest with appeals to Richard Hooker, the Elizabethan 
theologian who more than a century before them had formulated the theory that “the church and 
the commonwealth are personally one society.”  Hooker’s influence proved so pervasive that 8
much of early modern Anglican theology can be viewed as an extended commentary on his 
thought. Where the nonjurors were innovative with respect to older models of church-state 
relations was in their emphasis on the episcopacy in Church governance. While Hooker did not 
accord much importance to the bishops, the nonjurors held to the traditionally Roman Catholic 
6 Gardner, “George Hickes and the Origin of the Bangorian Controversy,” 73. 
7 Meza, “The Question of Authority in the Church of England, 1689 to 1717,” 63. 
8 Gascoigne, “The Unity of Church and State Challenged,” 76. 
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view that bishops were successors to the apostles and must be obeyed as such.  Their ideal 9
polity, then, would see Parliament and the rightful monarch work in tandem with the episcopate 
to ensure the peaceable submission of all Englishmen to the Church. Of course, this vision was 
complicated by the presence of nonconformists, as much in their own day as it had been in 
Hooker’s. Their response was simply to bar non-Anglicans from public life, as it would have 
been inconceivable to allow heretics and radicals into the institutions that directed ecclesiastical 
life. This solution was another area of overlap between the nonjuring minority and the Tory 
mainstream, which was just as committed to enforcing an Anglican social order. 
The Tories’ willingness to exclude other Protestants from public life manifested itself 
most clearly during the controversy over occasional conformity. In the first two decades of the 
eighteenth century, occasional conformity was the habit among some nonconformists of 
receiving Holy Communion in the Church of England once a year in order to qualify for elected 
office. It was predictably denounced in nonjuring circles, but took on greater significance when 
Tories sought to end the practice by strengthening the Test and Corporation Acts in Parliament. 
Dating from the Restoration, the Acts ensured that officeholders were regular Anglican 
communicants and were therefore key in maintaining the Hookerian paradigm.  Though in the 10
early years of Queen Anne’s reign their efforts were blocked by the Whigs, advocates of a strong 
Parliament and toleration for nonconformists, the Tories still managed to pass the Occasional 
Conformity Act of 1711 and place office-seeking Protestants under official censure.  11
9 Gascoigne, “The Unity of Church and State Challenged,” 61-62. 
10 Brent S. Sirota “The Occasional Conformity Controversy, Moderation, and the Anglican 
Critique of Modernity, 1700-1714,” ​The Historical Journal ​57, no. 1 (2014): 81. 
11 Sirota, “The Occasional Conformity Controversy, Moderation, and the Anglican Critique of 
Modernity, 1700-1714,” 104. 
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It should be noted that the Act of 1711 was widely ignored, with the election of 
non-Anglicans continuing apace in most locales. Still, the nominal ban on occasional conformity 
reveals the extent to which Anglican ecclesiology was bound up with political concerns, and 
highlights a debate over religious toleration that implicated the nation’s largest political factions. 
We have seen the perspective of religious traditionalists embodied in the Tories and the more 
extreme nonjurors, located on what might anachronistically be called the right; it was left to 
Benjamin Hoadly, a dedicated Whig and a latitudinarian, to spell out the antithesis to their 
theology.  
 
II. ​“The Nature of the Kingdom” 
George I, the first king of the House of Hanover, overwhelmingly favored latitudinarians in his 
episcopal appointments from his accession to the throne in 1714.  These clerics’ “Broad 12
Church” nomenclature indicates the goals of their intellectual project; also known as “latitude 
men,” they sought to create a more moderate Anglicanism, a less narrow and exclusivist faith 
than that of the stuffy High Churchmen, and attempted to integrate Enlightenment thought with 
Christian revelation. Whereas the nonjurors were invariably Tories, the latitudinarians mostly 
supported the Whigs and by extension religious toleration.  George I’s pastoral tastes were a 13
volte-face from those of his Stuart predecessor Queen Anne, who had preferred Tories and High 
Churchmen, and were certainly a boon to Hoadly. His appointment as Bishop of Bangor in 1715 
was a reward for his consistent advocacy of the Whig cause, mostly carried out up to that point 
in the pages of political pamphlets. 
12 Watson, “Rethinking the Late Stuart Church,” 145. 
13 Rutherford, “Reformation Principles,” 22. 
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Hoadly’s erudition and rhetorical skill gained him influential friends surrounding the 
king, allowing him to preach before His Majesty on a number of occasions and express his views 
directly to the sovereign.  Politicking did not cease with his new position—even as they neared 14
the twilight of their relevance, the nonjuring schism and the occasional conformity controversy 
were still in the public consciousness when Hoadly took the miter, and he did not waste time in 
commenting on them. Much in the spirit of his older polemical writings, in 1716 he responded to 
Hickes’ nonjuring manifesto with his ​Preservative Against the Principles and Practices of the 
Nonjurors​, and in the following year he expanded on his treatise in a sermon delivered to the 
king. Preached on March 31, 1717 in the chapel of St. James’s Palace, “The Nature of the 
Kingdom, or Church, of Christ” did more than rebut the nonjurors and make room for religious 
toleration: it forwarded a radical conception of the Church and pushed the boundaries of 
respectable latitudinarianism. 
Centered on Christ’s words in John 18:36, “My kingdom is not of this world,” Hoadly 
began his sermon with the commonsense observation that a word can often take on a different 
connotation than its original meaning.  Working off this basis, he maintained that the Christian 15
Church originally consisted only of those who recognized Jesus as the Messiah, or who 
“subjected themselves to Him, as their King, in the affair of Religion;” but now it clearly had 
much more to its name, with a visible institutional structure and precepts of its own.  Hoadly 16
reasoned that if Christ’s kingdom is not of this world, then everything this-worldly must be 
stripped away from his Church in order to make a true account of it. His critique proceeded on 
14 Gibson, ​Enlightenment Prelate​, 135. 
15 Benjamin Hoadly, “The Nature of the Kingdom, or Church, of Christ” (sermon, St James’s 
Palace, London, March 31, 1717), 3. 
16 Hoadly, “The Nature of the Kingdom,” 10. 
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two main fronts: first, on the role of human authority in mediating Christ’s kingship, and 
secondly, on the role of the commandments in the Christian life. 
As for the first subject, Hoadly offered a narrow interpretation of that Sunday’s gospel: if 
Christ is king, then he ​alone​ is king, the “sole Law-giver to his Subjects, and himself the sole 
Judge of their Behaviour, in the Affairs of Conscience and Eternal Salvation.”  In this regard 17
Jesus left no “visible, humane authority,” no “Viceregents,” no “Interpreters,” and no “Judges,” 
for if he had then the kingdom would be said to belong to men rather than to himself.  This 18
stands in obvious contrast with Hickes’ robust conception of ecclesiastical sanction over both 
individual souls and society more broadly. Hoadly’s denial of the same stemmed not only from 
his desire to preserve Jesus as the unique head of his Church, but from Christ’s own example in 
the establishment of the moral law. Although it is necessary in “humane Society” for lawgivers 
to delineate the proper interpretation of the laws they pronounce, Hoadly held that Christ “never 
interposeth, since his first Promulgation of his Law, either to convey Infallibility… or to assert 
the true Interpretation of it, amidst the various and contradictory Opinions of Men about it.”  19
Such would obviously negate Hoadly’s own pretensions to proper scriptural interpretation, but 
this point went unnoticed. 
Having stripped the Church of all jurisdiction in matters of doctrine, Hoadly then spelled 
out his ideal for the Church’s day-to-day affairs. Its lack of authority extended even to the moral 
life of the individual. Reiterating the absolute sovereignty of Christ over his people, Hoadly 
criticized those who “erect Tribunals, and exercise a Judgment over the Consciences of Men,” or 
17 Hoadly, “The Nature of the Kingdom,” 11. 
18 Hoadly, “The Nature of the Kingdom,” 11-12. 
19 Hoadly, “The Nature of the Kingdom,” 12-13. 
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who “make any of their own Declarations, or Decisions, to concern and affect the State of 
Christ’s Subjects, with regard to the Favour of God.”  Traditional models of the Church’s 20
teaching office, both Catholic and Protestant, have attempted to provide a moral framework 
whereby a believer can determine whether certain actions put him in a state of enmity or of 
friendship with God. Hoadly’s sermon was absent of any such notion—the conviction of 
individual conscience reigned supreme, with no external body able to make pronouncements of 
sin or virtue. On its face, this seems to betray a certain antinomianism, a despair that man can 
truly know the moral law. As with his earlier comments on doctrinal interpretation, though, 
nowhere did Hoadly apply his own standards to himself. He was more than willing to imply that 
those with claim to spiritual authority were usurpers to Christ’s throne, yet was content to 
arrogate moral authority to himself. 
The second half of the sermon analyzed the nature of the divine law. Hoadly posited that 
the spiritual nature of the Church must necessarily manifest itself in “the Nature and End of the 
Laws of Christ,” as well as in those “Rewards and Punishments, which are the Sanctions of 
[Christ’s] Laws.”  Since the commandments aim at happiness in the next life, Hoadly asserted 21
that they have no relation whatsoever with earthly existence. The examples employed to 
illustrate this point are of a decidedly political character: just as Christ never interposes in the 
interpretation of his law, neither does he set “the Offices, or Glories, of this State,” “the pain of 
Prisons, Banishments, Fines, or any lesser and more Moderate Penalties,” or even “the much 
lesser Negative Discouragements that belong to Humane Society” within its scope.  Were the 22
20 Hoadly, “The Nature of the Kingdom,” 14. 
21 Hoadly, “The Nature of the Kingdom,” 17. 
22 Hoadly, “The Nature of the Kingdom,” 18. 
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state to take it upon itself to enforce the observance of the commandments, Hoadly again 
emphasized that Christ’s unique authority would be undermined and his will defied. 
Here the relevance to the controversy over occasional conformity and the place of 
non-Anglicans in English society is clear. Aside from his ​Preservative ​against the nonjurors, the 
sermon was not Hoadly’s first entry into the particulars of the debate. In fact, one of his earliest 
political pamphlets was a defense of the latitudinarian bishops who had helped defeat an 
anti-occasional conformity bill in Parliament. Written during the War of Spanish Succession in 
1703, he argued that a ban on occasional conformity would alienate the dissenting Protestants 
whose support was crucial to the nation’s conflict with France.  No theology was invoked—only 23
geopolitical calculation. The fact that fourteen years later he was able to provide a thirty-page 
scriptural exegesis to argue for the same principle should not in and of itself speak against 
Hoadly’s sincerity. It does mean, though, that his argument for the illegitimacy of using “the 
Secular Arm, whenever the Magistrate should become Christian, to inforce [Christ’s] Doctrines,” 
was a sure way to signal his Whig politics before the king.  24
The separation of doctrine from governance represents Hoadly’s sermon at its most 
modern, for his conception of law encapsulated the Enlightenment’s challenge to classical and 
medieval thought. Hoadly defined the commandments as “general Appeals” to three things: to 
the will of God; to God’s “Nature, known by the Common Reason of Mankind;” and to “the 
imitation of that Nature, which must be our Perfection.”  To modern ears, a basic knowledge of 25
God accessible by unaided human reason would likely be equated with the natural law theory 
23 Bingham, “The Political Apprenticeship of Benjamin Hoadly,” 156. 
24 Hoadly, “The Nature of the Kingdom,” 23. 
25 Hoadly, “The Nature of the Kingdom,” 17. 
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formulated by Aristotle and refined by Thomas Aquinas. However, by Hoadly’s day the 
Scientific Revolution had already eroded confidence in Aristotelian physics, according to which 
an object seeks to attain a certain state so as to fulfil its purpose, rather than blindly obeying 
universal scientific laws. Consequently, early modern thinkers began to view the nature of 
things—both physical and metaphysical—with a new set of eyes. 
In the eighteenth century, the older idea that creation behaves according to laws 
immanent within creation itself was replaced by the idea that such laws are an imposition on 
nature.  As Leo Strauss rightly noted, the step from a non-teleological natural science to a 26
non-teleological anthropology is a short one indeed.  Hoadly could therefore identify “the Great 27
End” of the Church and the observance of the commandments as “Happiness, after the short 
Images of it [are] over here below,” yet declare in the same breath that Christ’s laws are “not of 
this World at all.”  Though he located man’s perfection in the imitation of the divine nature, 28
under the new theory of law this cannot meaningfully be said to be true. The law is in fact 
arbitrarily imposed, and thus cannot actually bring man to fulfillment—and so could safely be 
relegated out of this existence. While Hoadly may have spoken the same language as Aquinas, 
he clearly had something very different in mind.  His political convictions and his whole 29
conception of the Church can be traced back to these presuppositions. 
Hoadly’s debt to John Locke, who perhaps more than any other single figure can be 
credited with forwarding a theory of natural law that renders its own ancient foundations 
unintelligible, is well documented. For instance, political theorists Richard Ashcraft and M.M. 
26 Gascoigne, “The Unity of Church and State Challenged,” 65. 
27 Leo Strauss, ​Natural Right and History ​(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 8. 
28 Hoadly, “The Nature of the Kingdom,” 25. 
29 Cf. ​Summa theologiæ ​Ia IIæ, q. 1-5 and q. 90-94. 
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Goldsmith note that Hoadly defended Lockean thought on just rebellion in a 1705 sermon before 
the Lord Mayor of London.  In a treatise from 1708, he also distinguished between the divine 30
sanction of parental authority and the voluntary compact that makes up society, a clear reference 
to Locke’s social contract theory.  All of this corroborated and informed his Whig politics, 31
which would have been impossible outside a contractualist framework. Italian historian 
Guglielmo Sanna has recently attempted to interpret Hoadly’s oeuvre as a commentary on 
Hooker rather than Locke, but his efforts have been unconvincing. Although Hoadly was 
undoubtedly as receptive of Hooker as his contemporaries, Sanna has failed to demonstrate 
whether his political thought really owed more to Hooker than it did to Locke. Moreover, his 
analysis is entirely silent on “The Nature of the Kingdom” and its affinities with the liberal 
theories of natural law so important to Locke’s epistemology.  32
Hoadly concluded “The Nature of the Kingdom” with a summary of everything he had 
presented to the congregation. The Church is the kingdom of Christ, who alone is its sovereign 
and who alone can be said to have legitimate spiritual authority over his subjects, lest men 
deprive him of any of his kingly right; and all who truly believe in him are his subjects, Anglican 
and nonconformist alike, so any religious coercion on the part of earthly authorities is contrary to 
his will. In short, Hoadly articulated precisely the opposite of everything Hickes and his 
nonjuring confreres stood for. The implications of his sermon were that the Church of England 
should not be thought of as a visible institution, should exercise epistemic humility in doctrine 
and discipline, and should leave its affairs in the hands of the state to prevent overzealous men 
30 Ashcraft and Goldsmith, “Locke, Revolution Principles, and the Formation of Whig Ideology,” 
786. 
31 Bingham, “The Political Apprenticeship of Benjamin Hoadly,” 156. 
32 See Sanna, “Latitudinarian Politics and the Shadow of Locke.” 
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from persecuting other Christians. In this he critiqued not only the nonjurors and the opponents 
of occasional conformity, but the whole spirit of the age that preceded him. 
 
III. ​Controversy and Convocation 
Reaction to such a radical indictment was swift. The debate that followed the sermon’s 
publication, carried out in public letters and polemical treatises, came to be known as the 
Bangorian controversy after Hoadly’s episcopal see of Bangor. One of the first responses came 
in May 1717 from Andrew Snape of Eton College. He argued that Hoadly’s denial of the 
Church’s moral authority would open the nation not only to nonconformists, but—perish the 
thought—to Catholics as well.  Snape was no nonjuror, but his reaction linked the twin bugbears 33
of dissent and popery that were already paired in the schismatic mind. Other critics focused on 
Hoadly’s doctrine of sincerity, the idea that beliefs arrived at through the processes of reason 
should be legitimized simply because they are dearly held.  Still others noted that an ill-defined 34
sincerity would make the conception of the Church as a visible communion incoherent. Against 
these charges Hoadly claimed that in both his sermon and his earlier ​Preservative​, what he 
described pertained to the “universal invisible church” rather than the Anglican Church in 
particular. However, this was not clear from either text, and the fact that he preached “The 
Nature of the Kingdom” before the head of the Supreme Head of the Church of England himself 
seems to speak against this explanation.  35
33 Gibson, ​Enlightenment Prelate​, 152. 
34 Gibson, ​Enlightenment Prelate​, 181-83. 
35 Meza, “The Question of Authority in the Church of England, 1689 to 1717,” 84. 
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Though Sanna’s interpretation of Hoadly and Locke has been found wanting, he does 
offer an important insight: that Hoadly was a “chameleon,” who could baldly appeal to 
Enlightenment theories in the presence of other latitudinarians, and, conversely, to the plain 
historical truth of Scripture when attempting to persuade a nonbeliever.  This would explain 36
both his comfort in advancing such an extreme ecclesiology before George I, who was known to 
be friendly to reason-minded clerics and other avatars of the Enlightenment, and his attempt to 
backpedal the more questionable portions of his sermon once it came under public scrutiny. It is 
little wonder why many scholars, even those more sympathetic to Hoadly, have conceded to his 
adversaries in painting him as unprincipled.  As historian John Gascoigne has written, Hoadly’s 37
position really was one of “thoroughgoing Erastianism,” the doctrine of state supremacy over the 
Church, and his ecclesiology one “with which Hobbes would have found little to dispute.”  His 38
conduct during the Bangorian controversy did little to dispel these impressions. 
Like the occasional conformity controversy and the nonjuring schism before it, the 
Bangorian controversy was tied up with political concerns. The question of convocation, an 
annual synod of Anglican clerics that met with the opening of every Parliament, came to directly 
involve Hoadly but had rankled High Churchmen since the Restoration. In 1664, the clergy 
exchanged the right to levy its own taxes for the right to vote in the House of Commons. Pedro 
Thomas Meza argues that this agreement “removed one of the remaining vestiges of the 
medieval concept of the clergy as a separate legal estate.” Since the government now saw no 
financial incentive for the clergy to meet, the Convocation of Canterbury was ceremonially 
36 Sanna, “Latitudinarian Politics and the Shadow of Locke,” 144. 
37 Rutherford, “Reformation Principles,” 5. 
38 Gascoigne, “The Unity of Church and State Challenged,” 63. 
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opened and then immediately prorogued in almost every Parliament till 1701.  Even in Hoadly’s 39
day, Tories felt that the latitudinarians favored by William III and George I blocked any real 
debate on matters of doctrine and prevented them from voicing their concerns before a formal 
deliberative body. 
The High Churchmen were not entirely unjustified in their complaint. When the lower 
house of convocation drafted a bill of censure against Hoadly on May 3, 1717, charging him with 
the subversion of “all Government and Discipline in the Church of Christ on earth” and the 
reduction of “His Kingdom to a State of anarchy and Confusion,” proceedings were tabled by the 
latitudinarian Archbishop of Canterbury, William Wake. This led to not just another episode of 
Tory dissatisfaction; thereafter convocation was consistently prorogued until 1852, leaving the 
Church of England without a real synod until the first Lambeth Conference in the 1860s. Meza 
notes that this was undertaken in order to save Hoadly, a favorite of the court, from official 
reproach. Moreover, the Bangorian controversy came precisely at the same time that Tories 
attempted to restore convocation as an independent Church court, making Hoadly’s claims that 
he left the authority of the Church of England untouched rather suspect.  His tenor in the sermon 40
and behavior throughout the Bangorian controversy demonstrate that his overriding concern lay 
with the triumph of Whig politics rather than the interests of the Church he served. 
 
Conclusion: Hoadly and Modernity 
Whatever the particulars of his sermon, it is worth stepping back to consider Hoadly’s wider 
aims: in opposing the nonjurors’ near-medieval conception of church-state relations, he 
39 Meza, “The Question of Authority in the Church of England, 1689 to 1717,” 66. 
40 Meza, “The Question of Authority in the Church of England, 1689 to 1717,” 84-85. 
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advocated for the toleration of religious minorities (or at least Protestant ones), and against the 
use of coercion in religious matters on the part of the state. For this he might rightly be 
celebrated today, if for nothing but our own distaste for repressive confessional states. Such is a 
characteristic that we moderns should be happy to find that we share with Hoadly. However, he 
was not entirely forthright about the intellectual justification for his vision. Candid among 
friends but reticent before critics, his latitudinarian logic in “The Nature of the Kingdom” could 
not be taken to its conclusions without undermining every notion of earthly moral authority, and 
his Lockean paradigm led him to propose a subservient political role for the Church of England. 
Even after accounting for partisan bias, it is understandable why his opponents—and why 
scholars through the late-twentieth century—would hold him up as a particularly extreme 
representative of Enlightenment thought in the Georgian Church. 
Nevertheless, Hoadly enjoyed a long episcopate after the Bangorian controversy, serving 
in a number of sees across Great Britain until his death in 1760. Always a tireless proponent of 
Whig causes, his political writings went on to influence the Founding Fathers of the United 
States, and continue to be cited by American political theorists today.  Of course, his career was 41
not without fruit in his native isle. His anticipation of modern rhetoric surrounding religious 
liberty was paired with his favored status in the Court of St James’s, which in turn subsumed 
Anglican clerics’ foremost deliberative body under Parliament for a century and a half. Truly a 
fitting legacy for a man whose thought revealed the depth of liberalism’s rebuke to earlier 
models of Christian society. 
 
 
41 Gibson, ​Enlightenment Prelate​, 34-37. 
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